Kluwer, 1989. — viii, 307 pages. — (Studies in linguistics and philosophy). — ISBN13: 978-94-009-2723-0.
It is quite uncontroversial that a semantic theory for natural language must come to grips with the nature of intensional entities, such as properties, relations and propositions. For example, it must specify what it is to attribute a property to an individual and what information bearing structure results from such an operation. More generally, semantics must identify what types of entities are needed in a compositional account of the way phrases are interpreted, as well as how such entities are related to one another.
The research inspired by R. Montague's work provides us with a quite substantial exemplification of how these questions can be both fruitfully pursued and shed light on how language works. According to Montague's original proposal, intensions are built out of individuals and possible worlds. For example, basic properties can be analyzed as functions from possible worlds into sets of individuals; propositions, as sets of worlds. Using, then, the apparatus provided by type-theory, one can build along similar lines more complex intensional structures (e.g. properties of properties, relations having propositions as one relatum, etc.), as they appear to be required for the interpretation of the rich syntactic constructions one finds in natural languages.
Type-Shifting Rules and the Semantics of Interrogatives
On the Semantic Content of the Notion of Thematic Role'
Structured Meanings, Thematic Roles and Control
On the Semantic Composition of English Generic Sentences
Generically Speaking, or, Using Discourse Representation Theory to Interpret Generics
Realism and Definiteness